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A Case for the Federal Protection of
Television Formats: Testing the Limit
of "Expression"
FRANK L. FINE*
"En un mot, il aime l'argent plus que rev'putation, qu'honneur,
et que vertu . . ."**
La Flev'che, from L'Avare, by Moliev're (Act II, Scene IV)
I. INTRODUCTION
Reasonable minds will always differ on the issue of whether televi-
sion broadcasting in the United States actually serves the public interest.
In their desire to satisfy the widest cross-section of the American
populace,' the networks arguably have watered down the potential
of television as an artistic, informative, and theatrical medium, and
* B.A., 1974, Loyola University of Los Angeles; J.D., 1982, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles; LL.M. Candidate, Cambridge University, England; Member, California Bar. With
special gratitude to George D. Bane and John A. Altschul, attorneys and human beings par
excellence.
** Translation: "In a word, he loves money more than reputation, honor, and virtue ...
1. In about 1960, the major television networks radically altered the way in which broad-
cast advertisers had dominated television programming. No longer were shows created and pro-
duced by one "sponsor." Under the new regime, the networks assumed the reins of production
and sold 30 or 60 second spots to the advertisers. This is broadcast financing, and indeed
television itself, as we know it today. For an excellent discussion of the economic determinants
of modern television programming, see Rice, Network Television and the Public Interest, in
NETvoRK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIc INTERE T 193-95 (1980). The impact of this reposition-
ing of the sponsor on network programming and profits is vividly depicted by Rice:
Since the rates those advertisers will pay are proportional to the size of the audience,
the networks are economically motivated to offer programming that will attract as
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have turned television programming into the "medicine show" of post-
industrial society.2 Conversely, it may be perfectly plausible to con-
tend that what is good for Granny Goose is good for the viewing
gander. Nielsen ratings are, if nothing else, an indication of majority
tastes,3 even though the literature suggests that consumer satisfaction
is closely linked to subliminal identification with carefully manipulated
"program elements." 4 Whether television programming is considered
large an audience as possible. Once advertising revenues surpass the substantial but
fixed program-production costs, increases in audience size-and hence in revenues-
-translate almost directly into profit. Thus a change of only 1 or 2 percent in audience
share can mean millions of dollars in network profits .... Given this economic
structure, the programming objectives of the networks are easily understood. Pro-
grams are chosen on the basis of their hoped-for ability to draw a large audience
share at the expense of competing programs on the other networks. A weak program
inflicts both direct and indirect losses on the network that carries it. Its low ratings
not only will result in the loss of millions of dollars in potential profits during its
own time slot, but also may cut into the ratings of programs in adjacent time periods,
perhaps affecting the entire evening on which it is shown.
Id. at 193-94.
2. As explained by one commentator, the present system of network economics has caused
a shift in programming orientation from that of arousing viewer interest in the show as a
whole to that of discouraging him from flipping the channel:
A typical prime-time network schedule is deliberately designed so as not to pro-
duce radical shifts in audiences. Networks do not want audiences moving to switch
the dial. As one successful television producer put it, "We're a medicine show. We're
here to deliver the audience to the next commercial. So the basic network policy
is set in motion from the beginning of prime time to the end of prime time, pro-
grams to maintain and deliver those audiences to the commercial."
J. GREENmLD, TELEVISION: THE FIrST FIrY YEARS 56 (1977). It has been noted that prime-
time programming is dominated by situation comedies and adventure shows, whereas the fetid
daytime diet consists largely of soap operas and game shows. Rice, supra note I, at 194. The
new industry philosophy should be contrasted with the benevolent attitude which prevailed before
the networks obtained control over their programming, as exemplified by the following com-
ment submitted to Congress: "By making available throughout the country information, education
and the best of culture, network television brought about a cohesion among the people of
the United States which has never before existed . . ." Network Practices, Memorandum of
Frank Stanton, President, CBS, for the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce 12-13 (June 1956) (emphasis added). With reference to Mr. Stanton's comment on "in-
formation," the following note on the modern direction of news broadcasting is an interesting
contrast: "[C]ritical commentary programming is now more concerned with audience response
than with the subject of the commentary." L. Thompson, Trends and Issues in Commercial
Prime Time Television-an Analysis of Network Programming, 1966-76 3-4 (1977) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation submitted to Michigan State University, available in UCLA Theatre Arts
Library).
3. It was observed circa 1830 by a celebrated French political philosopher that the American
political system offers few protections for minority views. See A. DEToQuEVILLE, ON DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 74-82 (ed. Librairie Larousse 1975).
4. The clinical process that determines which programs shall go to series involves the
experimental testing of subjects. See Jencks, How Network Television Program Decisions are
Made, in NmwoRK TELEVISION AND miE PUBLic INTEREST 43-44 (1980). It is interesting to note
that an entire genre of television psychology has emerged. One media expert suggests, for example,
1985 / Television Format Protection
to be the triumph of banality or of democracy, the networks
undeniably will remain in the for-profit mode, while the writers will
compete at almost hopeless odds for Hollywood fame and fortune. 5
The networks will remain locked in a fiercely-drawn battle for the
most profitable program ideas.
Central to the development of new television programs, series, and
the like, is the "format." Although an absolute definition of "for-
mat" has not been agreed upon, a format generally is considered to
be a written presentation setting out the framework within which the
central characters of a proposed program will operate and includes
the setting, theme, and premise or general story line of the program.6
that television presents American culture as historically developed and unconsciously ingrained
and as offering a means to "convert many of the differential and disconnected segments of
our lives . . . and to analyze the ways in which social norms are implictly or explicitly present
.... " G. GoETanrs, =i TV RrruAL 33-35 (1981). A more macrascopic view of television's
power is evident in this comment:
[T]elevision is not simply a "medium" but a "mediator"-between fact and fantasy;
between our desire to escape and our need to deal with real problems; between our
old values and new ideas; between our individual lives and the life of the nation
and the world. Seen from this perspective, television becomes much more interesting
and much less simple than before.
Adler, Introduction: A Context for Criticism, in TELEVISION AS A CULTURAL FORCE 13 (1976).
5. A former high-ranking CBS executive estimated several years ago that the total number
of "program ideas" and formats "accumulated and reviewed" by CBS during a single season
ranges between only 200 and 300. Jencks, supra, note 4, at 42. This figure is preposterously
low in view of the myriad of sources from which Jencks himself admits the program ideas
and other materials are received. These sources include "the public, from writing and produc-
ing talent, from literary agents on behalf of published books or stories, from talent agents
on behalf of their clients, from production companies that have existing programs on the net-
work, and from producers and writers on the network's own payroll." Id. at 41. Supporting
the view that Jencks' estimate is unrealistically low is the assessment of a senior NBC attorney
who posited in 1958 that NBC reviewed some 30,000 to 40,000 "suggestions" each year, in-
cluding "everything from letter outlines to pilot films," but seriously studied between 2,000
and 3,000 of the total number of submissions received. Olsson, Dreams for Sale: Some Obser-
vations on the Law of Idea Submissions and Problems Arising Therefrom, 23 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 34, 55 (1958). Olsson also observed that it was not unusual at that time for
a motion picture studio to receive 20,000 "stories or ideas" per year. Id.
6. As might be expected, no consensus exists as to what a television format consists of.
According to Article IC, Paragraph 19 of the Writers Guild of America 1977 Basic Agreement
(Theatrical and Television) [hereinafter cited as the 1977 Basic Agreeement], a "format" is
in essence a "written presentation." The format of a "serial or episodic series" is quite
comprehensive:
[S]uch format sets forth [a] the framework within which the central running
characters will operate and which framework is intended to be repeated in each episode,
[b] the setting, theme, premise or general story line of the proposed serial or episodic
series and [c] the central running characters which are distinct and identifiable in-
cluding detailed characterizations and the interplay of such characters. It may also
include [d] one or more suggested story lines for individual episodes.
Id. Accord, Jencks, supra note 5, at 42, in which the author states that the program ideas
received by NBC most often come in the form of a "format, describing at length the characters
of a series, the era and locale in which they are placed, their interrelationships and the kinds
of story involvements which will typify the series."
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As the backbone of a potential hit series and the foundation upon
which the scripts of each episode are usually conceived, the format
figures importantly in the profit-making structure of the networks,
a point which has not been overlooked by the Writers Guild in its
minimum price schedules.'
Taking into account the time and effort that a writer will devote
to preparing a format8 and the staggering profits that a "hot" new
format may generate, the series creator must have rights to assert
against those who would rather plagiarize than pay for the author's
work. Moreover, these rights should be available under the unified
federal copyright scheme. Because state "property right" theories, with
few exceptions, have been preempted by federal copyright, it is
unrealistic to expect that contractual remedies can begin to address
the problem of nationwide or regional programming that consists of
pirated formats.
Ironically, neither the federal courts nor the legal commentators
have squarely addressed the issue of whether television formats are
entitled to federal copyright protection.9 However, this paper will
demonstrate that Congress and the federal courts, at least in princi-
ple, may be coming to terms with the need for federal protection.
II. TIE 1909 ACT: A TALE OF JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM
Under the prior federal statute, the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909
Act), a curious ambiguity existed as to whether television formats were
eligible for federal copyright protection. The statute and interpretive
7. The minimum fee for the "outline" of a television series during the 1980-81 year was
$605 for a 30 minute show and $1,148 for a 60 minute program. In contrast, the minimum
fee for a series "format" during the same period was $2,515, more than twice the amount
paid for the outline of a 60 minute program, irrespective of whether the program was 30 or
60 minutes in duration. The creator of the format may, of course, obtain additional fees for
scripts that he may submit for individual episodes. Even though the minimum payment for
scripts in 1980-81 varied from $1,664 to $2,160 for a 30 minute show and $3,175 to $4,186
for a 60 minute program, depending on whether the series was classified as a low-budget or
high-budget production, the creator of a purchased format would be in a favorable position
to negotiate his own rate of compensation. 1977 Basic Agreement, art. 13, §§7(g), (m)(1).
8. One commentator has observed that formats "are often fifty to a hundred typewritten
pages long and contain writing of considerable intellectual effort . . ." Libott, Round the
Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L.
REv. 735, 759 (1967).
9. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of the law governing
television formats prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 [hereinafter cited as
the 1976 Act], see Comment, Television Formats-The Search for Protection, 58 CAMIF. L.
REv. 1169 (1970). There is evidently no other legal literature which focuses directly on format
protectibility.
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House Report, antedating the invention of television, were under-
standably silent on the issue of format protectibility.' 0
The federal courts1' did nothing to clarify the status of formats.
In all of the federal cases involving the protectibility of formats, the
plaintiffs conceded the unavailability of federal copyright, and instead,
pursued his or her remedies under state law.'" Interestingly, although
this reluctance by authors to test the waters of federal protection
prevented a "case or controversy" from arising, the courts in these
cases said nothing by way of dicta to indicate that the author could
have asserted ownership of a federal copyright.
This uncomfortable stalemate ended in 1959, when the Copyright
Office formally announced its position that television formats were
not registrable under the 1909 Act. 3 The impact of non-registrability
was catastrophic to the cause of format protection. Under the statute,
the claimant was required to sue the Register of Copyrights to com-
pel the issuance of a certificate of registration before an action could
10. Section 4 of the Copyright Act of 1909 [hereinafter cited as the 1909 Act] generally
provided that, "[T]he works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include
all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. §4 (1909). Section 5 listed the classes of works registrable
for copyright as the following:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other
compilations. (b) Periodicals, including newspapers. (c) Lectures, sermons, addresses
(prepared for oral delivery). (d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions. (e)
Musical compositions. (f) Maps. (g) Works of art; models or designs for works of
art. (h) Reproductions of a work of art. (i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific
or technical character. () Photographs. (k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including
prints or labels used for articles of merchandise. (1) Motion-picture photoplays. (in)
Motion pictures other than photoplays. (n) Sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. §5 (1909).
11. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of cases arising under the federal copyright
law. 28 U.S.C. §1338(a). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights . . . ." Id.
12. To this date, not a single federal case has been reported in which the protectibility
of a radio or television format has been determined. The decisions under the 1909 Act are:
ABC v. Wahl Co., 36 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), modified, 121 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.
1941) (complaint generally alleging infringement of copyright was dismissed with leave to amend,
but plaintiff failed to amend); Herwitz v. NBC, 210 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (plaintiff
claimed infringment of a radio format under common law copyright, rather than federal
copyright); Dugan v. ABC, 216 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (plaintiff conceded that television
"sketch" was not protected by federal copyright). Under the 1976 Act, see Whitfield v. Lear,
582 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiff claimed infringement of state rather than federal
copyright as to television format). For further discussion of the treatment of formats in the
federal courts, see M. NIMER, NMMLER ON COPYRIGHT §16.02 (1978). [hereinafter cited as
NIMMER].
13. Pursuant to the Copyright Office Regulations, unpublished television and radio scripts
were protected by copyright, provided that they "consist of the actual text of the work to
be presented orally." 37 C.F.R. §202.6 (1959). But, according to the Regulations, "formats,
outlines, brochures, synopses or general descriptions of radio and television programs are not
registrable in unpublished form." Id. In 1971, the Copyright Office reaffirmed its position
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be brought against the infringer."4 Since neither Congress nor the courts
stepped in to give television formats the status of protected works,
the Copyright Office, by administrative fiat, deprived format creators
of standing to bring an infringement action under the 1909 Act.
The reluctance of litigants and judges alike to test the copyrightability
of formats was indicative of the air of pessimism which prevailed
under the former law and confirmed the widespread association of
television formats with "ideas," which have never been copyrightable,
rather than with the "expression" of ideas. 5 This view is substan-
tiated by the 1971 circulars of the Copyright Office in which formats
are included alongside program ideas as non-copyrightable material.
6
The characterization of television formats under the current statute,
the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), is anything but certain.
However, the legislative history of the Act and recent judicial
developments portend a new optimism.
III. PROTECTION UNDER THE 1976 ACT
A. Congressional Intent
The first step in a search for format protectibility under the 1976
Act would call for a "positive" approach to the issue. Language must
be found in the statute or accompanying House Report which may
be construed to suggest that formats are within the scope of federal
copyright. In the words of section 102(a), copyright shall subsist in
"original works of authorship."" Enumerated in the section are seven
in several circulars. See Copyright Office Circular 47 (1971). Circular 47 provided, in pertinent
part, as follows: "The general idea or title of a radio or television program cannot be copyrighted
.... To be acceptable for copyright registration in unpublished form, a script must be
more than an outline or synopsis. It should be ready for presentation or performance, so that
a program could actually be produced from the script deposited." Id. Circular 47E similarly
provided that, "The general idea or outline for a program is not copyrightable. Copyright
will protect the literary or dramatic expression of an author's idea, but not the ideas themselves."
Id. "Publication" may be defined as, "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending," 17 U.S.C.
§101 (1976).
14. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637
(2d Cir. 1958).
15. For a detailed discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy as applied to formats, see
infra notes 72-85.
16. See supra note 13.
17. Section 102(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: "Copyright protection subsists
.- in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
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categories of protectible works of authorship.'" Of these seven
categories, only two could even remotely accommodate television
formats: literary and dramatic works.
"Literary works," under the 1976 Act, are "works . . . expressed
in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia
-.. such as books, periodicals [and] manuscripts .... ,, 9 The House
Report does not define the terms "books," "periodicals," or
"manuscripts," nor do the Copyright Office Regulations shed any
light on their meaning.2" The lack of definition suggests that these
terms should be given the significance accorded to them under the
1909 Act.2 ' This approach, however, is not very helpful because under
the former statute, television formats were considered to be neither
books nor periodicals.22 Furthermore, in 1971, as demonstrated by
several circulars of the Copyright Office, formats were reduced to
the value of mere program ideas.
23
However, the "such as" language contained in the definition of
"literary works" suggests that books, periodicals, and manuscripts
are only illustrative of the material that may constitute a literary work.
In the words of the statute, a work "expressed in words" is a literary
work. 24 The view that this category is open-ended is confirmed by
a comment in the House Report that the list of protected works is
intended to provide "sufficient flexibility to free, the courts from rigid
or outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories." 25 Thus,
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1976). See infra
notes 33-36 and accompanying text (definition of works of authorship).
18. Section 102(a) further provides:
Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomines and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound
recordings.
17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1976).
19. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
20. The Regulations to the 1976 Act state that the term "literary work" shall "have the
meaning set forth in section 101 of Title 17." 37 C.F.R. §202.3(a)(2)(1983).
21. See NnfwER, supra note 12, at §2.04.
22. Under section 59(a) of the 1909 Act, "books" included "composite and cyclopedic
works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations." 17 U.S.C. §5(a)(1909). The Copyright
Office added to this list, "poems, catalogs, annual publications, and information in tabular
form." 37 C.F.R. §202.4(a) (1959). "Periodicals," on the other hand, were narrowly defined
to include "newspapers, magazines, reviews, bulletins, and serial publications . . ." 37 C.F.R.
§202.5 (1959).
23. See supra note 13.
24. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976)(definition of "literary works").
25. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss. 53 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HoUsE REPORT].
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some basis does exist for arguing that a television format, which is
in most cases expressed in words, may qualify for protection as a
literary work. However, as will be discussed later in this analysis,
a television format must be recognized as a work of authorship before
the format may be placed in any of the seven categories.26
Assuming for the moment a television format qualifies as a work
of authorship, could the format be characterized as a dramatic work?
According to the House Report to the 1976 Act, the meaning of
"dramatic work ' 27 is "fairly settled" under the old law and requires
no further elaboration. 8 This retention of the guidelines of the 1909
Act does not bode well for television formats, however, because the
Copyright Office Regulations protected only the "acting version of
plays for... television .... "29 In other words, the script for an episode
of a television series was and continues to be a dramatic work,3"
whereas the format of the series as a whole has never fit within this
category of protected works.
Television formats also may be protectible outside of the seven
established categories of section 102(a). As the House Report makes
clear, "the listing is 'illustrative and not limitative'. . . . [T]he seven
categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope of 'original works of
authorship' . . . . Rather, the list sets out the general area of
copyrightable subject matter .... ,3"' The ultimate determination of
whether television formats are copyrightable as literary works or as
works completely outside of the seven established categories therefore
depends on whether they constitute "works of authorship." This is
26. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 30 (discussion of dramatic works).
28. Id.
29. 37. C.F.R. §202.7 (1959).
30. Circular 47 of the Copyright Office, construing the 1909 Act, provided that, "The
unpublished script for a radio or television program, or a group of related scripts forming
a series, may ordinarily be registered for copyright." Copyright Office Circular 47 (1971). The
copyrightability of scripts under the 1976 Act is implicitly based on the old law. See NIM~mER,
supra note 12, at §7.06[A]. Moreover, as Nimmer accurately points out, "The fact that the
actors are not in the physical presence of the audience but are rather viewed (or heard) through
mechanical or electronic means does not derogate from the quality of drama. Thus a work
remains dramatic regardless of whether it is to be performed on the legitimate stage, radio,
television, or in any other medium." Id. at §206[A]. Nimmer's construction of the term "dramatic
work" is supported by the Copyright Office Regulations to the 1976 Act, which state that
included under the class of "Works of the Performing arts," are "works prepared for the
purpose of being performed directly before an audience or indirectly by means of a device
or process." 37 C.F.R. §202.3(b)(1)(ii) (1983).
31. See supra note 25, at 53. The statute itself demonstrates this intent with the language
that, "Works of authorship include the following categories." 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(1976) (emphasis
added).
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the threshold federal standard for all copyrightable works.3 2 But as
will be seen, this is no easy task.
The term "works of authorship" was "purposely left undefined"
by Congress.33 The House Report notes that the meaning of the phrase
is not so broad as to encompass all "writings" capable of copyright
under the Constitution because Congress did not wish to abdicate its
power to legislate the limits of copyrightable subject matter.3" In fact,
the new standard, "works of authorship," replaces the "all the writings
of an author" phraseology of the 1909 Act3" for the very reason that
the old standard was "substantially the same" as the empowering
constitutional language.36
What then are the tools of analysis to be employed by Congress
and the federal courts in determining the works which are or shall
be protected outside of the seven categories of section 102(a) or that
may come into one of these enumerated categories?37 In this area,
Congress opted for flexibility, intending neither "to freeze the scope
of copyrightable technology [n]or to allow unlimited expansion into
areas completely outside the present congressional intent."3
32. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
33. House REPORT, supra note 25, at 51.
34. The Copyright Clause empowers Congress "[tlo promote the progress of science and
usable arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, ci. 8.
35. 17 U.S.C. §4 (1909). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
36. HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 51.
37. It may appear at first blush that the courts would be engaged in legislative activity
in determining the scope of section 102. However, as Nimmer points out, the concept of "works
of authorship" was "intentionally left vague . . . .The courts are thereby permitted but not
required, to recognize as protectible, types of works not expressly included in the seven category
enumeration." NnIMR, supra note 13, at §2.03[A].
38. House REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 51 (emphasis added). One commentator has
noted that specific guidelines are already in effect:
In considering whether the federal Copyright Act can serve as a basis for protecting
specific materials or items of information, one therefore should make three fundamental
inquiries:
1. Is the material or information sought to be protected original?
2. Is the material or information sought to be protected fixed in a tangible medium
of expression?
3. Is the item sought to be protected the actual form of expression, or does the
real value reside not in the expression but in the underlying idea?
M.A. EPsTmn, MODER INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY 99 (1984) (emphasis added). The first two
elements of this test, "originality" and "fixation," are mandated by section 102(a) of the 1976
Act, which provides that "copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1976). The originality requirement
is not an onerous one. As Judge Frank stated for a unanimous court, "All that is needed
to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' contributed something more
than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own.' " Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951). See also HousE REPORT 1476,
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A second means of determining whether formats qualify for pro-
tection under an enumerated or residuary class of works of author-
ship appears to require a "negative" analysis of whether formats fall
"completely outside the present congressional intent." 3 9
Nothing in the statutory language itself expressly precludes the pro-
tectibility of formats. However, section 102(b) arguably forecloses the
copyrightability of formats in providing, in pertinent part, that, "In
no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea ... regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
4 . .,,1o Whether this language is intended to perpetuate under the
new law the relegation of a format to the status of a mere idea
depends, in large part, on the interpretation of the legislative history
of section 102.
The prior versions of section 102 did not contain subsection (b). 4"
Instead, the House Committee Reports to the earlier bills listed those
items which were not protected under the Act. Both the 1966 and
1967 House Reports specifically provided in a footnote that protecti-
ble works of authorship do not include, among other things, "ideas,
plans, methods, systems . . . formats and synopses of television series
and the like . . . . -42 Protection for these items, said the Committee
of the Judiciary in the 1967 House Report, could be achieved only
when "combined with copyrightable subject matter." 43
In a curious move, Congress completely eliminated the exclusionary
footnote from the final version of the House Report and grafted the
non-copyrightability provision of the 1976 Act into the text of the
supra note 25, at 51 (providing that the standard of originality "does not include requirements
of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit .... ") The concern of this paper is with the third
element suggested by Epstein, the conflict between idea and expression. See infra notes 54-83
and accompanying text.
39. House REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 51.
40. 17 U.S.C. §102(b)(1976). See also supra note 38.
41. NIMMER, supra note 12, at §2.03[A] n.7.
42. H.R. Rap. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 n. 1 (1967). Footnote 1 to this House
Report cited the following as examples of subject matter not intended to come within the scope
of the bill: "typography; unfixed performances or broadcast emissions; blank forms and
calculating devices; titles, slogans, and similar short expressions; certain three-dimensional
industrial designs; interior decoration; ideas, plans, methods, systems, mathematical principles;
formats and synopses of television series and the like; color schemes; news and factual infor-
mation considered apart from its compilation or expression." Id. This language was carried
over virtually unchanged from the 1966 House Report. See H.R. REp. No. 2237, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 44 n.1 (1966), which listed as unprotectible: "Typography; unfixed performances or
broadcast emissions; blank forms and calculating devices; titles, slogans, and similar short
expressions; certain three dimensional industrial designs; interior decoration; ideas, plans and
methods; systems mathematical principles; formats and synopses of television series and the
like; color schemes; news and factual information considered apart from its compilation or
expression . . ." Id.
43. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess 15 n. 1 (1967).
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statute (section 102(b)). However, section 102(b) is clearly not as com-
prehensive as the former Committee footnotes, omitting television
formats from the list of unprotected subject matter, as well as other
items which had been listed as non-copyrightable in the preceding
House Reports.4" This restructuring of the exclusionary language may
portend a favorable congressional attitude toward television formats.
The final version of the House Report cautions that, "Section 102(b)
in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under
the present [1909 Act] law. Its purpose is to restate. . .that the basic
dichotomy between expression and idea remain unchanged." 5 This
language could be construed to mean that Congress, in lieu of pass-
ing into law a finite list of non-copyrightable subject matter, decided
to shift to the courts the problem of determining the copyrightability
of all works not specifically excluded by Congress.16 Under this line
of reasoning, however, television formats would not have any status
at all because the federal courts have not addressed the issue of their
protectibility.
Melville Nimmer, in his treatise on copyright, goes further, raising
the possibility that Congress may have in fact adopted the notion
of format protectibility. Observing that many of the items from the
exclusionary footnote are not contained in section 102(b), Nimmer
posits whether this raises a "negative implication" that one or more
of the items formerly within the exlusionary footnote, but not incor-
porated into subsection (b), are now copyrightable works. 7
The evidence suggests that Nimmer's hypothesis applies particularly
to television formats. In the House Report to the 1976 Act, Congress
has clarified that unfixed broadcast emissions and certain industrial
designs, both of which were listed in the exclusionary footnote, shall
remain non-copyrightable. 8 With respect to other footnoted items,
Congress appears to have contemplated that the non-copyrightable
status accorded to them by the courts in their interpretation of the
1909 Act should remain in effect under the 1976 Act. These items
44. Section 102(b) provides as follows: "In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (1976).
45. House REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 57 (emphasis added).
46. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. Section 102(b) renders the footnote "unnecessary as to some, but not all of the
. .. items." NmINER, supra note 12, at §203.[A] n. 10.
48. HousE REPoRT, 1476, supra note 25, at 52-53.
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include news events independent of their form of expression,49 titles,5"
and color schemes5" - uniformly denied protection under each Act.
Television formats, on the other hand, had not been judicially
characterized under the 1909 Act. Congress must have had notice of
this fact when formats were removed from its list of non-copyrightable
works. In addition, Congress must have realized that the withdrawal
of formats from the list of prohibited subject matter left them in
better position than they would have been in had the exclusionary
footnote been enacted. Lending further support to the view that
formats are now protected by "negative implication" is the fact that
the Copyright Office Regulations no longer exclude television formats
from copyright, as they had been under the 1909 Act. 2
In summary, the finalization of the 1976 House Report arguably
may have resulted in the copyrightability of television formats as works
not "outside the present congressional intent." Recent federal cases
49. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Journal Transcript Corp., 558
F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978) (expression under the 1909 Act);
Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.D.C. 1980), Quinto v. Legal Times
of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981) ("expression" under the 1976 Act).
50. See, e.g., Warner Brothers Pictures Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310 (2d
Cir. 1934) ("Title" under the 1909 Act); Paramore v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (D.C.
Cal. 1925) ("Title" under the 1909 Act); Brandon v. Regents of University of California, 441
F. Supp. 1086 (D. Mass. 1977) ("Title" under the 1976 Act).
51. Color schemes have never been copyrightable per se. Protection has been limited under
the 1909 and 1976 statutes to designs embroidered or printed onto fabrics, which is distinguishable
from the copyrightability of "color combinations" alone. "Color" under the 1909 Act, see,
e.g., Primcot Fabrics v. Kleinfab Corp., 368 F. Supp. 482, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (protection
for arrangement of designs in a pleasing pattern); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)(ornamental designs on cloth protectible). "Color" under
the 1976 Act, see, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills v. John Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1096 (2d
Cir. 1977) (issue was whether color scheme was part of protected subject matter in the design,
but remanded to district court for determination) ("[W]e have never ruled as a matter of law
on the issue [of color scheme protectibility]") (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting); Greeff
Fabrics, Inc. v. Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (design protected).
Cf. also Pantone, Inc. v. A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (a 72
page booklet containing a "color matching system" was protected, but "the mere portrayal
of a series of gradations of color shades, standing alone, would present a doubtful case for
copyright protection") (emphasis added). Nimmer observes that color schemes "should" be re-
garded as copyrightable, acknowledging that as of this time, they are not. NmsaR, supra note
12, at §2.14.
52. For the exclusion of television formats under the 1909 Copyright Office Regulations,
see supra note 13. Under the 1976 Act, the Copyright Office Regulations have listed the following
subject matter as "not subject to copyright and for [which] registration jannot be entertained:
(a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols
or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere
listing of ingredients or contents;
(b) Ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the particular
manner in which they are expressed or described in a writing;
(c) Blank forms, such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank
checks, scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms and the like, which
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corroborate this view.5 3 It is now well-settled that "video game
formats," which are comparable in a number of ways to television
formats, have gained the status of "works of authorship."
B. The Liberalization of Judicial Attitudes
The video game craze burst on the American scene after Congress
had put the finishing touches on the 1976 Act. Therefore, the fact
that no reference is made to the copyrightability of video games
throughout the legislative history of the Act or in the statute itself
is not surprising. In the early 1980's, however, a number of federal
courts stepped into this void and created a body of case law govern-
ing video game protectibility. To fully appreciate the import of these
decisions within the context of the present analysis, an understanding
of the basic functioning of a video game is necessary.
An electronic video game is a post-industrial cross-product of home
computer and penny arcade technologies. All of the components of
the game fit, essentially, into a cabinet or box which contains a cathode
ray tube, electronic circuitry, a loud speaker, and hand controls for
the player. Memory devices in the circuitry store computer program
instructions which determine all of the appearances, movements, and
sounds which take place during the course of a play, including all
of the variations which may flow from the action of the player. 51
are designed for recording information and do not in themselves convey information;
(d) Works consisting entirely of information that is common property containing
no original authorship, such as, for example: Standard calendars, height and weight
charts, tape measures and rulers, schedules of sporting events, and lists or tables
taken from public documents or other common sources.
37 C.F.R. §202.1 (1982). Section 202.1 closely follows the language of the exclusionary foot-
notes. See supra note 42. It should be noted that there is no reference to formats in section
202.1(b) following the words "[i]deas, plans, methods, systems . . ." as there had been after
this identical language in the exclusionary footnotes. It should also be noted that if the Copyright
Office amends the Regulations or issues a circular to exclude television formats from copyright
protection, the copyright claimant would not be powerless to bring a federal infringement action,
as he was under the old law. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Under the 1976 Act,
the copyright claimant may respond to the refusal of the Copyright Office to register a work
by simply serving notice of the infringement action on the Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C.
§411(a)(1976) and HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 157. "Under section 411, a rejected
claimant who has properly applied for registration may maintain an infringement suit if notice
of it is served on the Register of Copyrights. The Register is authorized, though not required,
to enter the suit within 60 days; the Register would be a party on the issue of registrability
only, and a failure by the Register to join the action would 'not deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion to determine that issue."' Id. (emphasis added).
53. See infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
54. For a more complete description of a video game's components, see Williams Elec-
tronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 871-72 (3d Cir. 1982).
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The protectibility of the computer program component of the game
has never been in doubt. In the House Report to the 1976 Act, Con-
gress indicated that computer programs qualify as a form of "literary
work."" As the result of this protection, the copying of a video game
computer program without the permission of its "author" would con-
stitute an infringement of the program. 6 The ownership of the pro-
gram, however, did not prevent others from obtaining the program
indirectly by duplicating the sights and sounds of the game and later
incorporating them into a separate "non-infringing" computer
program."
This gap in protection was swiftly filled in by the courts. The aspect
of the game which may be visually and aurally perceived, usually
referred to as the "audiovisual display,"5 " is now copyrightable as
an "audiovisual work"" and as a "motion picture," 6  which is a
subclass of audiovisual works.6' In effect, two versions of the video
game, as embodied in the computer program and as displayed from
the cathode ray tube, are now copyrightable works of authorship.2
55. HousE REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 54. "The term 'literary works' . . . includes
* . . computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's
expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves." Id.
56. Artic International, 685 F.2d at 876-77. See also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
57. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982). "Such replica-
tion is possible because many different computer programs can produce the same 'results,'
whether those results are an analysis of financial records or a sequence of images and sounds
. . . to take an elementary example, the result of displaying '4' can be achieved by an
instruction to add 2 and 2, subtract 3 from 7, or in a variety of other ways. Obviously, writing
a new program to replicate the game of 'Scramble' requires a sophisticated effort, but it is
a manageable task." Id.
58. The audiovisual display may be divided into two parts. Artic International, 685 F.2d
at 872 n. 2. The "attract mode" consists of the pre-game audiovisual effects, such as the repetitive
display of the name of the game, the previous high score, and so on. Id. The "play mode"
refers to the audiovisual effects displayed during actual play. Id. at n. 3.
59. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
617 (7th Cir. 1982). "The audio component and the concrete details of the visual presentation
constitute the coyrightable expression . . . ." Id. Accord, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Bally
Manufacturing Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. I11. 1983). The 1976 Act defines
"audiovisual works" as "works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or elec-
tronic equipment, together with any accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature
of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." 17 U.S.C.
§101 (1976).
60. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981).
61. "Motion pictures" are defined as "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related
images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with any
accompanying sounds, if any." 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
62. One federal court has suggested that a video game is also copyrightable as a literary
and musical work. See Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Elcon Industries, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937,
943 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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But what precisely does the "expression" of the audiovisual display
consist of? Is the "expression" limited to the features which are fixed
and non-variable, or does the expression encompass the "combina-
tion of elements" which make up the game as a whole, including
those which are subject to the control of the player? If the expres-
sion of the display embraces the latter, isn't the format of the game
actually being protected? As we will see, a television format contains
the structural spine of the entire series, as opposed to the "play"
of each episode. Similarly, the author of the video game format creates
the contingency for a second person, the player, to write the "script"
for that player's game, which would not exist but for the author of
the format.63
In essence, the courts have indicated that the format of a video
game, as embodied in the audiovisual display, is the form of
"expression" subject to copyright. This conclusion is evidenced by
the language and analysis employed by the courts. In variously worded
opinions, the courts have stated that the combination of elements which
comprise the video game, rather than its fixed sequences, constitutes
the protected form of "expression." In one case which tested the
copyrightability of the video game "Donkey Kong," the form of "expres-
sion" was said to include "the characters, obstacles and background as
well as the sequence of play of the game."" Another court stated more
generally that plaintiff's copyrights in several games cover the
"audiovisual expression of various game ideas [including] the distinc-
tive color and design of the space ships and other players, as well as the
sound accompanying the playing of the games." 65 Put another way, the
courts in these cases are protecting the pattern of elements which make
up the game as a whole, that is, the "theme" of the game, 66 the in-
63. See Rubenstein, Copyright Protection for "Elaborated Ideas," 224 Law Times 296,
et seq. (1957).
64. Nintendo of America, Inc., 564 F. Supp. at 943. But cf. Stern Electronics, Inc., 669
F.2d at 857. "Assessing the entire effect of the game as it appears and sounds, we conclude
that its repetitive sequences of images is copyrightable as an audiovisual display." Id.
65. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981). As stated
in Bally Manufacturing Corp., 568 F. Supp. at 1277-78: "What is protected is a particular
form of a game, and the protection increases as the work in question moves away from a
generalized form [of 'game idea'] toward a particularized expression." (emphasis added).
The foregoing is essentially a rephrasing of Judge Learned Hand's "abstractions test." See
infra note 74 and accompanying text.
66. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. at 229. "This Court has held that plaintiff
is entitled to a copyright on 'Asteroids,' because the idea of a video game in which the player
shoots his way through a barrage is an idea that is sufficiently general so as to permit more
than one form of expression." Id. Accord, North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.,
672 F.2d at 617. "PAC-MAN is a maze-chase game in which the player scores points by
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teraction of characters or obstacles,67 the development of the "game
story,"68 and even the setting (e.g., mazes, outer space).
The federal courts find no currency in the argument that the
copyrightability of video game formats tends to deprive competing
authors and the general public of works embodying the video game
ideas. To the contrary, the protection of video game formats as a
"class" of works, has the effect of stimulating creative activity by
rewarding those authors who reduce their ideas into forms of
"expression," while at the same time, ensuring that game ideas re-
main in the public domain .6  If a certain video game format does
not contain a level of sophistication sufficient to amount to
particularized "expression," the courts may freely conclude that the
maker of the format cannot prevent others from borrowing the various
guiding a central figure through various passageways of a maze and at the same time avoiding
collision with certain opponents or pursuit figures which move independently about the maze." Id.
"The elements of the Galaxian video game appear on a background star pattern
consisting of twinkling colored lights that roll from the top of the screen to the bottom.
The game involves a missle-firing rocket ship operated by the player, plus a forma-
tion of enemy aliens. The aliens are arranged in a convoy of five horizontal rows.
There are four denominations or ranks of aliens, with the highest ranking nearest
the player's ship. Each rank has a distinguished color. The highest ranking alien
is shaped like a rocket ship, but the other ranks have flapping wings. Individual
aliens unpredictably invest and swoop down to bomb the player's ship."
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp at 473-74.
67. In North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., supra fiote 59, the court ac-
corded copyright protection to specific characters in the video game at issue . . . : "the ghost
monster and gobbler, as well as the distinctive gobbling action and the manner in which of
space rocks the gobbler disappeared upon being captured." Bally Manufacturing Corp., 568
F. Supp. at 1278.
68. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d at 617 ("Under certain
conditions, the central figure may temporarily become empowered to chase and overtake the
opponents . . ."); Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 474 ("Sometimes the alien attack consists
of misinformations involving the alien flagship or chief, as well as flying alien escorts").
69. In the leading case of North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., supra
note 59, the precise issue before the Seventh Circuit was "the scope of copyright protection
to be afforded audiovisual games such as PAC-MAN." North American Philips Consumer
Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d at 615. The court stated the following: "Plaintiff's audiovisual
work is primarily an unprotectible game, but . . . to at least a limited extent the particular
form in which it is expressed (shapes, sizes, colors, sequences, arrangements, and sounds) pro-
vides something 'new or additional over the idea."' Id. at 617 (emphasis added). Thus, plain-
tiff did not prevent defendant from creating a "maze-chase" game typified by PAC-MAN,
nor the "standard game devices," such as mazes, tunnels, and dots, which are common features
of video games. Id. In Amusement World, Inc., supra note 60, defendants argued that plain-
tiffs were attempting "to monopolize the use of the idea of a video game ['Asteroids'] in which
the player fights his way through asteroids and spaceships." Amusement World, 547 F. Supp.
at 227. However, as in the Seventh Circuit PAC-MAN case, the court took a position which
frustrates copying but stimulates creativity:
The critical difference in this case is that the idea of a video game involving asteroids
is a much more general idea than the rather specific concept of a jewelled pin in
the shape of a bee, and the former is capable of many forms of expression. Thus,
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characters, sequences, and other features comprising the game.70
It will be shown in Part IV that the "expression" of a television
format can be far more elaborate than that of a video game's
audiovisual display."' For this reason, the protection afforded to video
game formats logically and necessarily should extend to television
formats.
IV. THE "ExPRESSION" OF TELEVISION FoRMATs:
AN ANALYTICAL FRAM EwoRK
As in the example of video game formats, the availability of federal
copyright to television formats as "works of authorship"7 2 can pro-
mote and facilitate the interest of authors in obtaining a reward for
their creativity, and at the same time, prevent the monopolization
when plaintiff copyrighted his particular expression of the game, he did not prevent
others from using the idea of a game with asteroids. He prevented only the copying
of the arbitrary design features that makes plaintiff's expression of this idea unique.
These design features consist of the symbols that appear on the display screen, the
ways in which those symbols move around the screen, and the sounds emanating
from the game cabinet. Defendants are entitled to use the idea of a video game
involving asteroids, so long as they adopt a different expression of the idea-i.e.,
a version of such a game that uses symbols, movements, and sounds that are dif-
ferent from those used in plaintiff's game.
547 F. Supp. at 227 (emphasis added) (held, no infringement due to absence of substantial
similarity). See also infra note 73.
70. Bally Manufacturing Corp., 568 F. Supp. at 1281-82 ("Once the noncopyrightable
elements of Hyperball are put to one side, relatively little remains. The color and shape of
the playing field is primarily all that is left .... In viewing the two games solely with reference
to their copyrightable features, one is struck by the almost complete absence of substantial
similarities .... The similarities are almost wholly the product of the games' reliance on similar
but noncopyrightable game concepts. The specific artwork and exterior configuration in which
Williams claims a copyright is not substantially similar except in that both games portray an
adversary-though the adversaries hardly appear or act the same and the concept of an adver-
sary is hardly copyrightable.").
71. The fact that a video game format may be conveyed sensorially through a cathode
ray tube and speakers whereas a television format is usually communicated in written form
is of no import. With great effort the format of a video game can be described verbally, as
is shown in the cases cited by this article. Conversely, a television format may subsist entirely
in a video-tape, without a written embodiment of the series. See, e.g., Goodson-Todman Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., infra note 88. Whether a work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression is the critical issue, not the particular medium in which the work is fixed. H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 25, at 52-53. See also Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 480 ("The
Act contains no restrictions on the type of material objects suitable for fixation"). In the case
of video games, the "fixation" requirement is satisfied, not by the transient imagery emitted
by the cathode ray tube, but by the fact that "It]he printed circuit boards are tangible objects
from which the audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time more than transitory."
Id. Accord, Artic International, 685 F.2d at 874 (citing cases). Under the 1976 Act, "A work
is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord
... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
72. See supra note 17, and accompanying text.
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of abstract "program ideas."" These private and public interests may
be accommodated by characterizing television formats as a "genre"
of protectible "works of authorship," and by leaving to the courts
the case-by-case determination of whether the "idea" or the "expres-
sion" of the format has been taken.
Unfortunately, few guidelines have been established or even sug-
gested for the making of this idea/expression determination. Many
federal courts have cited the famous "abstractions test" of Judge
Learned Hand as the appropriate benchmark:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
73. It is axiomatic under the federal copyright law that the "expression" of a work, not its
"idea," is protected by copyright. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879). As the court explained in the frequently quoted case of Eichel v. Marcin:
The object of copyright is to promote science and the useful arts. If an author, by originating
a new arrangement and form of expression of certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw
these ideas or conceptions from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each
copyright would narrow the field of thought open for development and exploitation,
and science, poetry, narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches of literature would
be hindered by copyright, instead of being promoted.
241 F. 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
The language contained in the Copyright Clause "[tto promote the progress of science
and usable arts" has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to mean that
the interest of the author is subordinated to that of the greater public good." See, e.g.,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The sole interest
of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labor of authors"); Mazer, supra note 67, 347
U.S. at 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare... "); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 774, 783 (1984) (" 'Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts."'). This balancing of the interests of the author
and the public is manifested in the legislative history of the 1909 Act. The House Report
stated that, "In enacting a copyright law, Congress must consider
... two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so
benefit the public; and [s]econd, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental
to the public." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). The public interest
aim of the copyright law suggests an interplay between the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment, as the Court appeared to imply in stating that "society's competing
interest [is] in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce .... " Sony Corp.,
104 S. Ct. at 782. See generally, DeAcostav. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944); Golds-
tein, Copyright and theFirst Amendment, 7OCoLUm. L. REv. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970); Nimmer, Copyright and the First Amendment, 17 BULL.
CR Soc'y 255 (1970). For a specific treatment of this conflict between the constitutional
provisions, as applied to record retailers, see Fine, Record Piracy and Modern Problems
Qf Innocent Infringement: A Comparative Analysis of United States and British Copyright
Laws, 1 Loy. L.A. ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 113 (1981), reprinted in 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 357 (1981) and 6 COLUM. J. ART & L. 69 (1983).
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than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.7"
A more practical analytical tool was articulated by Professor
Zechariah Chafee in his well-known "pattern" test:
No doubt the line does lie somewhere between the author's idea and
the precise form in which he wrote it down. I like to say that the
protection covers the ' pattern" of the work . . . the sequence of
events, and the development of the interplay of characters."5
A hybrid of the "abstractions test" and the "pattern test" would
appear to present the most accurate yardstick of "expression." Such
an approach, which we will call a test of "comprehensiveness,"
demands an analysis of both the depth and breadth of the work. A
hybrid approach appears to have been used by several federal courts
in determining the "expression" of a verbal work such as a play or
script. The proposition that actionable copying "extends beyond exact
reproduction of words . . ." is well settled. 76 As one court has
observed, "[lt has been emphasized repeatedly that the essence of
infringement lies in taking not a general theme but . . [the work's]
particular expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes,
events and characterizations." 77
Since the "expression" of a play or script consists of the "pattern"
of those elements which have attained a state of "concreteness, ' 78
logic would appear to dictate that the "expression" of a television
format consists of this same "pattern" of concrete elements. This
leaves us with the task of determining the elements of a television
format. A meaningful distinction may be drawn between formats for
"fictional" programs (e.g., situation comedies, soap operas, and detec-
74. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
75. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 513-14
(1945) (emphasis added).
76. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
77. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added). Often-cited for this proposition is Gethers v. Blatty, 283 F. Supp. 303, 305 (C.D. Cal.
1968), in which the court stated that copyright protection extends to "the development, treat-
ment, and expression of such elements as theme, locale, settings, situations, ideas, bare basic
plots and ordinarily characters." Id.
78. The term "concreteness" has also been used to describe that which is taken, i.e., whether
another "descends so far into what is concrete as to invade [its] expression." National Comics
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tive shows) and "non-fictional" shows, such as news-magazines, talk-
shows, commentaries, and travelogues.
A. Fictional Television Series
A format for a "fictional" television series appears to be fully
capable of satisfying the test of "comprehensiveness." 7 9 The author
of such a series format will usually describe in detail the ongoing
"framework" of the series-or those elements of theme, situation,
and characterization which recur in virtually every episode and which
Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951). "Concreteness" is not
to be confused with the requirement of the 1976 Act that a work of authorship must be in
a "tangible medium of expression" in order to qualify for copyright. As Professor Nimmer
has stated:
[T]he expression of an idea to which copyright may attach requires concreteness only
in the sense that concrete is the polar opposite of abstract. In this sense, an expres-
sion may be most concrete (i.e., specific and detailed rather than general and abstract)
and nevertheless not be embodied in tangible form . . . .Thus an author may write
in tangible form the following: "A man becomes entrapped in a cave. The newspaper
accounts of the unsuccessful rescue attempts catapult the victim to nationwide fame.
The man becomes a victim not only for commercial exploitation." The foregoing
would probably be regarded as merely an abstract idea, not the concrete expression
of an idea, and hence not copyrightable. This notwithstanding the fact that the idea
was in written form and therefore concrete in the alternative sense mentioned above.
NiamR, supra note 12, at §2.02.
79. At least two state courts have so held. In Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd.,
9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970), plaintiff alleged that his written format for a
television series tentatively entitled, "The Coward," had been pirated by defendants in their
production of the series, "Branded." In Fink's conceived series, the hero is a World War
II Army lieutenant, Dundee, who is courtmartialled for failing to obey orders under extenuating
battle conditions. Following the war, Dundee becomes a valiant police officer in Greenwich
Village, admired by his junior colleagues, but haunted by his wartime memories. Although
the holding of the Court of Appeal was limited to the reversal of a demurrer, the language
of Justice Reppy's opinion is insightful as to how a television format may achieve sufficient
elaboration to constitute a form of "expression" under state copyright law. Justice Reppy found
that Fink's plan for "The Coward" might be termed "a partial (but substantial) development
toward a completely expressed television series, well calculated to give a clear insight to what
the finished article would be like." 9 Cal. App. 3d at 1006. Addressing the specific issue of
what the protectible elements of "The Coward" format consisted of, the Court of Appeal
concluded that protection would not be afforded to the abstract ideas contained in the format,
or in the words of the court, to "an eternal verity or super objective, such as ... eternal youth
is no panacea [citation] [or] inanimate objects can give solace to humans . . . ." Id. at 1013.
Rather, the protectible subject matter consisted of " 'the development [and] treatment. . .of
such elements as theme, . . . situations .... bar basic plots and characters.' " ld. at 1014 [quoting
Gethers v. Blatty, supra note 70] (emphasis in text). Applying these guidelines to "The Coward"
format, the court determined that the protectible elements included "the plan for an entire
series, the full back story, the molding of an important part of the hero's character and per-
sonality, the method of presenting and capturing the back story in the consequential episodes,
and various portrayal techniques . . . . " Id. The court added in conclusion that, "It is not
likely that defendants would have produced their end product if plaintiff had not offered and
supplied his elaborate idea." Id. (emphasis added). This concept of an "elaborated idea" relied
upon in Fink appears to have originated with Rubenstein, who described it as follows:
[I]f an author has a novel and original idea and decides to clothe it in a costume
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give the series its style and flavor." The author may also include in
the format "treatments" of the central and peripheral characters, in-
cluding their biographical and psychological profiles and the dynamics
of their interaction on the program. The author may establish the
very "means" of presenting the story, such as the "texture" of the
film (i.e., whether it will appear lavish or stark, pleasant or foreboding,
natural or mysterious), 8 whether classical or popular music should
be used for the sound track, and whether the story should be presented
in linear fashion or through flashbacks. The series creator may even
describe "evolutionary" developments in the series, such as the onset
of new characters and the withdrawal of old ones, or the gradual
strengthening or decay of existing relationships.8 2
Assuming a series creator were to generate a format elaborately
describing such a broad pattern of elements, could it be disputed that
the unauthorized copying of the format by another "descend into"
the "expression" of the work? The proof of "expression" seems to
be apparent in the narrow scope of the monopoly and the complete
absence of penetration into publicly owned ideas. Obviously, to the
extent that each of these series elements approaches generality, the
likelihood that ideas rather than "expression" would be taken, in-
creases. However, this problem is not particular to formats, but is
inherent in the taking of any verbal work.
of his own fashioning (the fabric, the needle and thread, the thimble lie on his study
table with a sketch showing what the rehabilitated idea will look like), surely only
he should be allowed to elaborate the sketch and finish off the costume-a costume
which, but for the author, would never have existed.
[S]urely the test will be: could the interpreter have produced the finished article,
the end product, if the author had not produced the elaborated idea?
Rubenstein, supra note 63 at 296. See also Hamilton National Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706,
709 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (judgment for plaintiff based on appropriation of radio format) (" 'It is
the means of expressing these ideas rather than the ideas themselves which warrant protection.'
[citation] 'Such a right can only exist in the arrangement and combination of the ideas, i.e.,
in the form, sequence, and manner in which the composition expresses the ideas, not the ideas
themselves . . . .' [I]n the field of radio broadcasting concreteness may lie between the boun-
daries of mere generality on the one hand and, on the other, a full script containing the words
to be uttered and delineating the action to be portrayed . . .").
80. In the popular situation comedy, "All in the Family," for example, there was hardly
an episode in which Archie Bunker did not call his son-in-law, "Meathead," or assume a regal
posture in his lazy-boy reclining chair. Twenty years earlier, the Ralph Kramden character of
"The Honeymooners" displayed similar but totally distinct mannerisms in bellowing to his
wife, "Alice!" and in waiting imperiously and impatiently at the table for his dinner.
81. It was no accident that the 1970's situation comedy, "Barney Miller," had a crusty,
simplistic look, similar to that of 1950's comedy series such as "The Honeymooners" and
"I Love Lucy."
82. In the modem detective series, "Remington Steele," for example, the male and female
protagonists began the series as platonic partners, but later romanticized their relationship. Such
a gradual development could have been part of the series format.
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B. Non-Fictional Television Programs
Can the format of a "non-fictional" reality-based program be pro-
tectible? These shows do not provide "characters." Instead, the home
viewer is presented with either a host or the disembodied voice of
a narrator. Moreover, these shows do not offer any "evolutionary"
developments, but rather, a continuous repetition of the same "theme,"
whether the program presents provocative news features, guest inter-
views, or visits strange and exotic places. Since the elements of such
a program consist simply of its repetitive theme and technical means
of presentation (e.g., hosts/narration, staging devices and effects), a
format describing these elements would probably constitute nothing
more than a collection of non-protectible ideas.83 The format would
not appear to achieve any "comprehensiveness" whatsoever. Copyright
protection for such "compounded" ideas could result in a monopoly
over a "type" of show,"4 rather than in the specific show apart from
others in the genre. Furthermore, due to the "factual content" of
83. On the non-protectability of "themes," "plots," and program "ideas," see Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., supra note 67, in which the author of a play entitled "Abie's
Irish Rose" alleged that her play had been infringed by defendant's motion picture, "The Cohens
and the Kellys." The court found, however, that the only similarity between the two works
consisted of the theme of a "quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of
their children, the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation." See also Dugan v. ABC, 216
F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (plaintiff conceded that his television "sketch" was not protected
by federal copyright). As amended in 1947, Section 980(a) of the California Civil Code pro-
vided that: "The author or proprietor of any composition in letters or art has an exclusive
ownership in the representation or expression thereof .... ." CAL. CIV. CODE §980(a) (emphasis
added). Under this statute, see Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 128 Cal. App.3d 628, 633,
180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1982) (Plaintiff's 29 page motion picture outline consisted only of a "brief
description" of six principal characters and a "short narration for a number of scenes," which
in its totality, was "no more than a collection of ideas . . ."). Ware v. CBS, Inc., 253 Cal.
App.2d 489, 491, 61 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1967). Defendant only borrowed from plaintiff's script,
"[tihe theme or idea of a man who finds happiness with an inanimate object, whom he treats
as a real person." Id. On the non-protectibility of theatrical devices and techniqus, see Taylor
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156 (C.D. Cal. 1953) (Plaintiff failed to obtain
a common law copyright in a "particular arrangement of cameras and lights . . ."); Serrana
v. Jefferson, 33 F. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1888) (use of a stage gimmick such as a water tank on stage
is not protected by copyright); Barnes v. Minor, 122 F. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) (copyright does
not protect settings, drop curtains, staging, lights, or kinetoscopes).
84. See, e.g., Midas Productions, Inc. v. Baer, 437 F. Supp. 1388, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (The
similarities between plaintiff's screenplay, "Rednek Amerika-Love it or . . ." and defendants'
motion picture, "Macon County Line," were "all . ..woven around a familiar matrix of
ideas which . . . are common to all pictures which show young people 'on the move."'; Bevan
v. CBS, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (The similarities between "Stalag 17"
and "Hogan's Heroes" were "virtually necessitated by the use of the historical setting, clearly
in the public domain"); Miller v. CBS, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 502, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ("Many
of the similarities [between the two works] naturally arise from the idea of a convict studying
law in prison.").
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these programs, a copyright could represent a significant threat to
the dissemination of information.
8 5
Those who oppose copyright protection for television formats usually
make the argument that a television script embodying the final evolved
work must be a subject of federal copyright. They also assert that
the protection of any work occupying the "middle ground" between
the abstract idea and the shooting script would endanger an already
difficult balance in the competing interests of the author and the public.
Although this is a valid concern, the premium on a format is far
greater than that accorded to a script. Therefore, a means to protect
the series creator without intruding into publicly owned ideas should
exist. The balance of interests may be maintained by simply defining
the elements of a copyrightable format. The earlier discussion of for-
mats for "fictional" television series suggests a workable starting point.
In short, a protectible television format should contain: (1) the on-
going "framework" of the series, (2) "treatments" of the central and
peripheral characters, (3) the "means" of presenting the story, and
(4) any "evolutionary" developments. The description or content of
each of these program elements should satisfy fixed criterion, such
as those suggested in the previous discussion.
Despite the favorable evidence in support of the protectibility of
television formats, however, neither Congress nor the federal courts
have expressly determined their status. We must therefore consider
other means of protection.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This article will now propose some useful suggestions for the author
of a television format who has (1) just finished preparing the final
draft of a format and is in doubt as to how to prevent a network
"rip-off;" or (2) just learned that the recipient network or some other
85. As Judge Yankwich eloquently stated in Echevarria v. Warner Brothers, Inc., 12 F.
Supp. 632, 638 (S.D. Cal. 1935):
One cannot build a story around a historical incident and then claim exclusive right
to the use of the incident. If originality can be claimed in opposing Aguinaldo to
Funston . . . then all the novels, short stories, and dramas written about the Civil
War, opposing Grant to Lee, might never have been written after the first one because
the author of the first one could have claimed exclusive right to the product.
See, e.g., Norman v. CBS, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (The 148 alleged similarities
between plaintiff's biography of poet Ezra Pound and defendant's television program about
the poet consisted of non-protectible descriptions of the poet's lifestyle, habits, and events);
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (Plaintiff could not
monopolize the true event of a girl who had been buried alive for five days).
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entity is broadcasting a program that embodies a format created by
that author.
A. Preventative Action
Upon completion of a format, the author should proceed
immediately to prepare a pilot script of the projected series, then
register with the Copyright Office"6 a copy of both the format and
the script. Great care should be taken to place all the elements of
the format into the script.8 7 In this way, if the Copyright Office refuses
to register the format, the format is nevertheless protected by virtue
of "incorporation" into the script. The writer may even attach as
an "addendum" to the script an outline of future episodes, being
sure to identify the addendum as part of the script.88 The Copyright
Office registration of the unpublished script will have three impor-
tant effects:
(1) The certificate of registration will provide the author with
"prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the
facts stated in the certificate.
' 8 9
(2) Such registration tends to discourage piracy by the network
by serving notice of the prima facie effect of the registration. This
deterrent effect may be achieved by submitting to the network the
script "of the series" along with a separate written format, under
a cover letter stating that the format was deliberately and pains-
takingly embodied in the registered script. A writer should also attach
as an enclosure a copy of the certificate of registration.
(3) In the event that the network subsequently receiving the
author's materials pirates the format, the author can claim the
infringement of the script, the format, or both. 9
86. It is suggested that the author simultaneously register his script with the Writers Guild.
This Guild registration may, in litigation, provide valuable evidence of first authorship, thereby
establishing the possibility of "access," a key element in the proof of infringement.
87. For the element of "formats" see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
88. Similar methods have been successfully employed in the past. See e.g., Giangrasso
v. CBS, 534 F. Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff obtained a federal copyright in a radio
play script and "promotional presentation"); Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Inc. v. Kellogg,
Inc., 513 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff embodied format of quiz-show "To Tell the Truth"
in videotape and registered the tape as an audiovisual work).
89. 17 U.S.C. §410(c)(1976). As noted in the House Report:
[E]ndowing a copyright claimant who has obtained a certificate with a rebuttable
presumption of the validity of the copyright . . .orders the- burden of proof. The
plaintiff should not ordinarily be forced in the first instance to prove all of the
multitude of facts that underline the validity of the copyright unless the defendant,
by effectively challenging them, shifts the burden of doing so to the plaintiff.
HousE REPoRT 1476, supra note 25, at 157 (emphasis added).
90. In light of section 410(c), it appears that the defendant would bear the burden of
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After registration with the Copyright Office, the author should
obtain physical proof that his format was in fact submitted to the
network for payment. This establishes the network's "access" to the
format, a key element in an infringement action9 and is helpful in
the proof of a duty to pay in a contract action.92 Such tangible evidence
can be obtained in several ways: (a) by personally delivering the format
to an executive at the network while simultaneously procuring his
signature to an acknowledgment of receipt;93 or (b) by mailing the
format to the network by certified mail, return receipt requested.
B. Redress of the Wrong
If an author must litigate the copyrightability of his television
format, the preferable forum would be a federal court for several
reasons:
(1) The unsuccessful effort of the author to register the format
does not prevent an assertion of a federal copyright claim, because
the attempt to register will confer standing to sue. 94
(2) The author can assert in federal court not only a federal in-
fringement claim, but also, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion, all of the claims available under state law9" that are not sub-
ject to federal preemption. 96 Moreover, if the state claims are dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction in the event that the federal claim
proving that the plaintiff's work does not satisfy the requirements of a "work of authorship."
However, if the defendant is not successful in rebutting the validity of the copyright, plaintiff
would still have the burden of proving the infringement.
91. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
1977) (explaining the elements of a copyright infringement action).
92. See discussion of pendent jurisdiction infra at note 95. See Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d
715, 749 ("[A] factual issue rather than one of law, is presented as to whether defendants
used plaintiff's synopsis or developed their production independently thereof") (emphasis added);
Whitfield v. Lear, 582 F. Supp. at 1191 ("Defendants are correct in urging that the plaintiff
must ultimately demonstrate that defendant used his ideas in order to recover [under California
law of implied-in-fact contract]").
93. Assuming that the price of the format has not been determined by the parties, the
receipt should contain a provision that the network agrees to pay the reasonable value of the
format if the network uses it without the author's permission. In an action for breach of implied-
in-fact contract based on such unauthorized use, "reasonable value" may consist of the value
of the format to the network. Donahue v. United Artists Corp., 2 Cal. App.3d 794, 802, 808
Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
94. See supra note 47.
95. The test is whether plaintiff's federal and state claims "derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Gibbs seems
to require dismissal of the state claims, however, if the federal claim, though substantial enough
to confer jurisdiction, is dismissed before trial. Id. at 726.
96. 17 U.S.C. §301(b) lists three alternative ways in which a state right of action may
survive preemption. These are "with respect to-(l) subject matter that does not come within
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is dismissed before trial, the author could re-assert these local claims
in state court because there has been no determination on the merits.
the subject matter of copyright ... including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible
medium of expression; or (2) any cause of action arising from an undertaking commenced
before January 1, 1978; or (3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 . . . ." 17 U.S.C. §301(b)(1976) (emphasis added). The disjunctive "or" phrasing of sec-
tion 301(b)(l)-(3) permits the states to provide relief if any of the three above conditions are
satisfied. Under section 301(b)(1), for example, the ultimate test is whether the "subject matter"
is "outside the scope of. . .copyright . . ." House REPORT 1476, supra note 25, at 131. This
can be determined in two ways. Clearly, "unfixed works are not included in the specified 'sub-
ject matter of copyright."' Id. Additionally, subject matter not qualifing as "works of author-
ship" under the federal standard are properly left to the states, whether these works are fixed
or unfixed. NIBMR, supra note 12, at §202.
Assuming arguendo that a television format is created after January 1, 1978 and that it does
not qualify as a "work of authorship," state remedies conferring "equivalent" and non-equivalent
rights will survive federal preemption. This means, essentially, that if the state right of action
offers redress for unauthorized reproduction or distribution of the format or ideas contained
therein, two of the exclusive rights provided by section 106, such a state remedy is not affected
by preemption.
Conversely, if the television format does in fact qualify as a "work of authorship," state
legal theories conferring "equivalent rights" will be preempted. The issue of whether a
state legal theory grants such an equivalent right depends, for the most part, on whether
the theory is based on "contract" or "property." A state action for breach of contract plainly
survives preemption because of the added element in a contract claim that the defendant breach
a promise to pay. NImMER, supra note 12, at §16.04[C]. The various state "implied-in-fact"
contract decisions therefore remained untouched by preemption. See generally: Desn); supra
note 92 (Held, an implied-in-fact contract may have been formed where plaintiff orally con-
veyed his story idea to the producer's secretary on the telephone with the express understand-
ing of payment, if the secretary expressly or implicitly promised to pay plaintiff in exchange
for the disclosure). Several California courts have focused on the conditions attending disclosure
as creating a duty to pay. See Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d 435, 441, 319 P.2d 776
(1957) ("[T]he assent of the producer [to the contract] is manifested by his acceptance of the
idea or material submitted under the circumstances, a part of which is that it is reasonably
understood that a professional author expects payment of the reasonable value of the idea
or material, if used, so that the conduct of the producer in accepting it implies a promise
to fulfill those reasonable expectation.") (emphasis added). Accord, Donahue v. Ziv Television
Programs, Inc., 245 Cal. App.2d 593, 606, 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966) ("[T]he first contact...
set up by an agent. . . must have indicated [to the producer] that the persons whom the agent
brought together with him were not social callers"); Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495,
504, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968). Other legal theories are less likely to survive, due to their strong
"property" characteristics. Unjust enrichment, for example, is an "equivalent right" because
this theory of recovery depends on whether defendant "has used for its benefit any property
of [plaintiff]. . . ." Weitzenkorn v. Lessor, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 794. Accord, NINM, Ert supra note
13, at §1.01[B]. In California, breach of confidence based on the unauthorized disclosure of
an idea communicated in confidence at arms-length is regarded as a form of quasi contract,
and is also preempted. See Whitfield, supra note 92 at 1190 n. 3 (citing Davies v. Krasna,
14 Cal. 3d 502, 509-12, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975)); NnmDAR, supra note 13, at §16.06. When
unfair competition is based on unauthorized copying, rather than passing-off, this theory is
preempted. Giangrasso, supra note 88, at 478. Similarly, "the mere act of reproduction does
not constitute conversion since reproduction constitutes an interference with the intangible literary
or artistic property right, not with the tangible property right in the chattel which is being
reproduced." NIMMnER, supra note 13, at §101[B] n. 51; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Conversion ... is a tort involving acts-
possession and control of chattels-which are qualitatively different from those prescribed by
copyright law . . . ").
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(3) In the event that defendant's profits are difficult to establish,
the plaintiff may, under the 1976 Act, elect statutory damages which
include a special measure in cases of wilful infringment.9
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to shoW that a television for-
mat may, through the application of labor, rise to the status of a
form of expression. This fact, together with the premium placed on
formats in the marketplace, dictates that such works be protected as
a class, rather than denigrated as the result of individual instances
of banality. Ideas may be "free as the air," 98 but there is no sound
logic in allowing what is "[F]orge[d] out of . . . ideas with skill,
industry, and imagination into concrete forms . . .,99 to be subjects
of common ownership.
It has been urged herein that the federal protection of television
formats would not result in the "disappearance" of police shows,
westerns, soap operas, and the other types of programming. For
decades, threadbare plays and scripts with less sophistication than many
of today's formats have received the benefits of federal copyright
without endangering the genre to which the play or script belongs.
The courts have successfully maintained the public ownership of ideas
contained in plays and scripts by faithfully adhering to the standards
which they themselves developed for distinguishing between "idea"
and "expression." Similarly, there is every reason to believe that a
rigorous set of guidelines applicable to television formats would, as
in the case of other verbal works, prevent unwarranted intrusions into
the public domain.
97. The statutory maximum may, in the court's discretion, be raised from $10,000 to $50,000.
17 U.S.C. §504(c) (1976). The statutory measure may be elected in lieu of actual damages and
profits. Id. at §504(a) and (b) (1976).
98. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 287, 171 N.E. 56 (1930).
99. Stanley v. CBS, 35 Cal.2d 653, 672-73, 221 P.2d 73 (1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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